

## Message Text

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ACTION SS-30

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 1569

EXDIS/SALT

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E. O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: SEMENOV STATEMENT, MARCH 8, 1974(SALT TWO--403)

FOLLOWING ARE TRANSLATIONS OF (1) SEMENOV STATEMENT AND (2)  
TRUSOV STATEMENT, PRESENTED AT MEETING, FRIDAY, MARCH 8, 1974.

SEMENOV STATEMENT, MARCH 8, 1974

THE SOVIET SIDE ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO WORKING OUT  
POSSIBLE MEASURES WHICH WOULD RELATE TO QUALITATIVE LIMITATION OF  
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. THIS TASK IS DEFINED IN THE DOCUMENT  
ENTITLED BASIC PRINCIPLES OF NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH PROVIDES THAT  
"LIMITATIONS PLACED ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS CAN APPLY BOTH  
TO THEIR QUANTITATIVE ASPECTS AS WELL AS TO THEIR QUALITATIVE  
IMPROVEMENT." IN THE COURSE OF PAST DISCUSSIONS THE USSR DELEGA-  
TION HAS SET FORTH PROPOSALS FOR SOME QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS ON  
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, AND ALSO STATED THAT IT WAS PREPARED  
TO SEEK IN A CONSTRUCTIVE SPIRIT WAYS TO REACH AGREEMENT THEREON.

THE WORKING OUT OF TRULY MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS IN THE  
AREA OF QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, AS IN  
ANY OTHER AREA RELATED TO PREPARATION OF THE PERMANENT AGREEMENT,  
IS POSSIBLE ONLY WITH STRICT ADHERENCE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL

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SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE, WHICH IS

FUNDAMENTAL AT OUR NEGOTIATIONS. ONE OF THE IMPORTANT AREAS OF QUALI

TATIVE LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IS THE LIMITATION OF MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLES (SOVIET DELEGATION TODAY INDICATED PREFERENCE FOR SPELLING OUT "MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLES" WHERE RUSSIAN ABBREVIATION RGCH IS USED, INSTEAD OF FOLLOWING PREVIOUS PRACTICE OF USING "MRV/MIRVS"). TODAY I INTEND TO ADDRESS THIS ISSUE.

GUIDED BY THE DESIRE TO CONTRIBUTE TO WORKING OUT MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS FOR THE LIMITATION OF MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLES, AND ACTING IN ACCORD WITH THE AFOREMENTIONED PRINCIPLE, THE SOVIET SIDE INCLUDED IN THE DRAFT PERMANENT AGREEMENT IT TABLED ON OCTOBER 9, 1973 AND ARTICLE VIII, PERTAINING TO SUCH LIMITATION.

OF COURSE, A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF LIMITING MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLES ON THE BASIS OF STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE COULD BE FOUND IN THE CONTEXT OF SOLVING THE BASIC PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. IT MUST ALSO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT, ALONG WITH OTHER FACTORS OF THE STRATEGIC SITUATION, THE EXISTENCE AND BUILD-UP OF MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLES ON BALLISTIC MISSILES IN THIRD COUNTRIES.

DURING THE WORKING RECESS THE SOVIET SIDE ONCE AGAIN THOROUGHLY AND COMPREHENSIVELY EXAMINED THE QUESTION OF LIMITING MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLES. THE RECORD OF PAST DISCUSSIONS AND THE PERTINENT STATEMENTS OF THE SIDES WERE CAREFULLY STUDIED.

THE SOVIET SIDE CAME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE PROPOSAL THAT THE SIDES ASSUME AN OBLIGATION NOT TO DEPLOY MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLES ON MORE THAN A CERTAIN PORTION OF THE ICBMS AND SLBMS PERMITTED EACH SIDE UNDER THE PERMANENT AGREEMENT IS OBJECTIVELY SOUND. IN THIS CONNECTION THE SOVIET SIDE PROCEEDS FROM THE PREMISE THAT LIMITATIONS ON MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLES MUST APPLY TO PRECISELY BOTH OF THE AFOREMENTIONED TYPES OF BALLISTIC MISSILES, I. E., BOTH ICBMS AND SLBMS. LIMITING THE DEPLOYMENT OF MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLES ON ONLY ONE OF THESE TYPES, FOR EXAMPLE ON ICBMS, WOULD BE INADEQUATE FOR SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF LIMITING MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLES AND THEREFORE WOULD NOT BE IN ACCORD WITH THE TASK OF WORKING OUT EFFECTIVE MEASURES FOR LIMITING THE QUALITATIVE

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IMPROVEMENT OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

IT IS EVIDENT FROM THE STATEMENTS OF THE SIDES AT THE CURRENT PHASE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT THERE IS A COMMON UNDERSTANDING REGARDING THE DESIRABILITY OF RESOLVING THE QUESTION OF LIMITING MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE PERMANENT AGREEMENT ON MORE COMPLETE MEASURES FOR THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. THE TASK IS TO FIND SUCH SOLUTIONS TO THIS PROBLEM

AS WOULD FULLY CORRESPOND TO THE AGREED PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE, AND WOULD CONSEQUENTLY BE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE.

MR. AMBASSADOR, IN CONNECTION WITH THE QUESTION OF LIMITING THROW-WEIGHT, WHICH HAS BEEN MENTIONED HERE, I WOULD LIKE TO SAY THE FOLLOWING. PROCEEDING FROM THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY

AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE, AND THE NEED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ALL ASPECTS OF THE STRATEGIC SITUATION AND THE FACTORS RELATED TO IT, THE USSR DELEGATION BELIEVES THAT IF THIS QUESTION IS TO BE CONSIDERED AT ALL, THE AGGREGATE THROW-WEIGHT OF SUCH TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AS LAND-BASED ICBMS, SLBMS, STRATEGIC BOMBERS AND DELIVERY AIRCRAFT ABOARD ATTACK CARRIERS, IN THEIR TOTALITY, SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. AS TO FORWARD-BASED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROPOSALS OF THE SOVIET SIDE, THEY MUST BE WITHDRAWN TO THEIR OWN NATIONAL TERRITORIES.

THE PROPOSAL TO LIMIT THE AGGREGATE THROW-WEIGHT OF ICBMS IS UNACCEPTABLE BECAUSE IT IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE AFOREMENTIONED FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE AND DOES NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ALL ASPECTS OF THE EXISTING STRATEGIC SITUATION.

THE USSR DELEGATION BELIEVES THAT FROM THE CONSIDERATIONS ON QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS, WHICH IT HAS SET FORTH TODAY AS WELL AS AT PREVIOUS MEETINGS, IT FOLLOWS THAT IN THE APPROACHES OF THE SIDES TO QUALITATIVE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS THERE ARE POSITIONS WHICH ARE CLOSE OR IN CONTACT, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME THERE REMAIN QUESTIONS REQUIRING ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION WITH A VIEW TO FINDING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS WHICH ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE, AGREED AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL.

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00 ACDE-00 /031 W

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FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2258

INFO SECDEF WASHDC

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 1569

EXDIS/SALT

TRUSOV STATEMENT, MARCH 8, 1974

TODAY I INTEND TO ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF VERIFYING COMPLIANCE WITH THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE POSSIBLE FUTURE PERMANENT AGREEMENT ON MORE COMPLETE MEASURES ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

IN YOUR MARCH 1, 1974 STATEMENT YOU JUSTLY NOTED THAT A UNIQUE ELEMENT OF BOTH THE ABM TREATY AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT IS THE PROVISION FOR VERIFICATION OF THESE AGREEMENTS BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS," AS WELL AS "THE UNDERTAKING BY BOTH PARTIES NOT TO INTERFERE WITH SUCH MEANS OF VERIFICATION."

ONE CANNOT BUT AGREE WITH YOUR EVALUATION OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PROVISIONS ON VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL MEANS, WHICH ARE RECORDED IN THESE DOCUMENTS, AS WELL AS WITH THE FACT THAT /THIS IS THE FIRST TIME IN HISTORY THAT AN ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT HAS INCLUDED SUCH A VERIFICATION PROVISION AND ITS IMPORTANCE SHOULD NOT BE UNDERESTIMATED."

THE DOCUMENT ENTITLED BASIC PRINCIPLES OF NEGOTIATIONS, SIGNED AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL IN 1973, STATES THAT "LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS MUST BE SUBJECT TO ADEQUATE VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS."

THUS WE HAVE PRECISELY RECORDED GUIDANCE FROM THE LEADERS OF OUR COUNTRIES, AS WELL AS THE EXPERIENCE OF WORKING OUT PROVISIONS ON VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, AND ALMOST TWO YEARS EXPERIENCE IN VERIFYING THE OBLIGATIONS INCLUDED IN THE ABM  
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TREATY AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT ON THE BASIS OF THESE PROVISIONS. ALL THIS MAKES IT CONSIDERABLY EASIER FOR US TO WORK OUT MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE VERIFICATION PROVISIONS. OF COURSE, IN SO DOING WE SHOULD PROCEED FROM THE NEED TO VERIFY NOT JUST SOME SEPARATE PORTION OF THE LIMITATIONS CONTAINED IN THE FUTURE PERMANENT AGREEMENT, BUT ALL THE TOTALITY OF THE PROVISIONS OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT, ALSO, OF COURSE, INCLUDING WEAPONS MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT WHICH MUST BE CARRIED OUT IN COMPLIANCE WITH PROVISIONS OF THE PERMANENT AGREEMENT.

PROCEEDING FROM THIS PREMISE, THE PROPOSALS OF THE SOVIET SIDE PROVIDE THAT IT BE RECORDED IN THE DRAFT PERMANENT AGREEMENT THAT FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROVIDING ASSURANCE OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT EACH SIDE WILL USE NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION AT ITS DISPOSAL IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH GENERALLY RECOGNIZED PRINCIPLES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW. IN THIS CONNECTION THE SIDES WOULD ALSO ASSUME AN OBLIGATION NOT TO INTERFERE WITH THE NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION OF THE OTHER SIDE.

AS I UNDERSTAND YOUR MARCH 1, 1974 STATEMENT, MR. AMBASSADOR, THE POINTS OF VIEW OF THE SIDES COINCIDE REGARDING THE NEED TO INCLUDE THE DRAFT PERMANENT AGREEMENT THE VERIFICATION PROVISIONS SET FORTH ABOVE.

OF ESSENTIAL IMPORTANCE IS A PROVISION TO THE EFFECT THAT THE SIDES WILL NOT USE DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES WHICH IMPEDE VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT. SUCH AN OBLIGATION WOULD NOT REQUIRE CHANGES IN CURRENT CONSTRUCTION, ASSEMBLY, CONVERSION, OR OVERHAUL PRACTICES.

THIS PROVISION IS CONTAINED IN THE ABM TREATY AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, WHICH ARE IN FORCE, AND EVIDENTLY THE POINTS OF VIEW OF THE SIDES COINCIDE IN THIS RESPECT AS WELL.

PROCEEDING FROM THE ABOVE, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE DELEGATIONS COULD FORMULATE CONCRETE PROVISIONS ON VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE FUTURE PERMANENT AGREEMENT AND THEREBY TAKE AN APPRECIABLE STEP IN THE DIRECTION OF ACCOMPLISHING THE TASK BEFORE US.

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AS FOR SPECIFIC PROVISIONS ON THE LIMITATION OF SOME TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS OR OTHERS AND RELATED OTHER MEASURES SUBJECT TO VERIFICATION, THE PROPOSALS OF THE SOVIET SIDE, WHICH HAVE ALREADY BEEN SET FORTH, TODAY AS WELL, FULLY TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THEIR VERIFIABILITY BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. THIS APPLIES EQUALLY TO ALL LIMITATIONS PROPOSED, BOTH QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE. JOHNSON

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